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III. THE CORPORATION AND THIRD PERSONS.

Contracts entered into between corporations and third
persons have not given rise to as much confusion and to as
many questionable judicial decisions as the contracts of
corporators inter se. This is because such contracts are not
embodied in the charters over which the states have reserved
the power of amendment or repeal, and there is therefore no
seeming identity of these contracts with the corporate charters. Two propositions have been advanced by the courts
with general uniformity:
First: The mere fact that the state has reserved the
right to revoke or alter a charter of incorporation granted
by it gives to it no direct power to alter or impair the contracts entered into between the corporation and third
persons.
Second: A corporation which is subject to the reserved
power of the state cannot limit the exercise of that power
14i
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by entering into contracts with third persons. If the state,
where no such contract exist, can enact changes in the
corporate charter, it can enforce such changes rotwithstanding the fact that it may' thereby indirectly be impairing the
obligation of such contracts.
The result of the combination of these two propositions
is simply that the state can exercise no greater and no less
power over corporations because of the existence of outstanding corporate contracts. These contracts are themselves beyond the power of the state to impair, unless it be
as an indirect and remote consequence of the state's revocation or amendment of the charter of the corporation in
accordance vith the power which it had reserved for that
purpose.
Let us suppose, by way of illustration, that a state passes
an act providing that the fact that an insured person committed suicide shall not constitute a defence to an action on
his policy of life insurance, unless suicide was contemplated
by the insured at the time of the arplication for his policy.
Under this law an insurance company issues a policy. Subsecluently the act of the state is repealed. Can such a repeal
be held valid as regards the policy previously issued? If
there was no reserved power to give to the state control of
the charter of the insurance company, it is clear that such a
repeal would effect an impairment of the obligation of the
contract entered into between the policy-holder and the
company.9" Would the law be otherwise had such a reserved power existed? Evidently not. for such power could
not be construed to give to the state rights which it would
not otherwise have possessed over an independent contract.
In Ashielot R. R. Co. v. Elliot, 58 N. H. 451 (1878), a
railroad company was incorporated by the state of New
Hampshire in the year 1846. subject to the reserved power
of the state to annul or amend its charter. In i851 it
executed a mortgage upon its corporeal property and franchises. Subsequently the legislature of the state passed two
acts: one enacting that if this mortgage was not paid
'ai]a,'iai
v. Knights Templars' and Masons' Life Indemnity Co., 95
Fed. Rep. 70 (189).
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within a year the mortgagees should succeed to all of the
rights of the company, and the other providing that the
mortgagees should have the right, upon four weeks' notice
being given, to sell the road. The court, per Chief-Justice
Doe, held that these acts were unconstitutional and void,
because they arbitrarily deprived the railroad company of a
property right not granted to it by the state-namely, its
equity of redemption in the mortgaged property. \hat
these acts attempted, in addition to the fatal objection to
their validity pointed out by the court, was to alter the
mortgage contract existing between the company and the
mortgagees, and also for this reason the legislation in the
case would have been an unjustifiable exercise of the reserved power of the state.
In Bank of the Old Dominion v. McVeigh, 20 Gratt.
(Va.) 457 (187), the question before the court was the
constitutionality of an act of the state of Virginia, which
authorized anyone indebted to a branch bank of the state
situated within the Union lines to pay his debt to the parent
bank if the latter was located within the Confederate lines,
and vice versa. The purpose of the act, and what it would
have accomplished had its validity been sustained, was to
enable debtt. owed to the banks to be paid in depreciated
Confederate money. The clharter of the batik concerned in
the case in question was subject to the reserved power;
nevertheless. the court held that the act was void, since it
effected an impairment of the obligation of the contract
between the banks and their debtors. " It is undoubtedly
true," said the court, " that it is in the power of the legislature, under its reserved rights, to alter or amend the
charters of banking institutions, or to take them away altogether. But it does not follow that in.doing this it may
interfere with and abrogate contracts lawfully made under
such charters, or disturb rights already legally vested under
them in the course tf their legitimate business. The legislature dil tlezerve the right to modify and amend the charter
of the Bank of the Old Dominion. but it did not and could
not reserve the right to alter c,ntracts made tnder the old
charter. All contracts liale in pursuance of its charter are
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to be construed with reference to the charter in force at
the time they w-ere made. The charter may be changed,
but the contracts made under that charter cannot be altered
by the legislature."
The soundness of these decisions is beyond doubt, and, so
far as known, there has been no judicial departure from
the principles which they establish. 98 There are some
cases in the books which seem to advocate contrary doctrines, but it is believed that these can all be explained upon
other grounds. In some of them the decision proceeds upori
the theory that the contract, the impairment of the obligation
of which is objected to. did not in fact exist, or else was not
as far-reaching in its terms as claimed. 7 In others the
""It (the legislature) has no right even under such circumstances
(that is, where there is a reserved power in the charter) to take away
or destroy the property or annul the contracts of a-railroad company

with third persons." lake Shore and Michigan Southern-Railway Co.
v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684 ttg8). "The object of a reservation of this
kind in acts of incorporation is to insure to the government control
over corporate franchises, rights, and privileges which, in its sovereign

or legislative capacity, it may call into existence; not to interfere with
contracts which the corporation created by it may make." Dissenting
Opinion of Mr. Justice Field In rc Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700
(1878). " A legislature cannot, by amendment or repeal of a charter,
deprive the members of a corporation of the property or contract rights
it has acquired by the excrci.-e of its corporate powers. .

.

. It cannot

annul contracts made by the corporation with third persons in the
exerci.-e of its lawful franui.-es. It cannot undo that which is done.
It cannot say that that does not exist which does in fact exist. It
cann'i recall an executed grant of property. But it can revoke for the
future anything in the charter of a promissory character whether it is
contractual or merely gratuitous." Northern Bank of Kentucky v.
Stone, 88 Fed. Rep. 413 (1I.98).
" Such was, for example, the real basis of the decision in the Pennsylvania College Cases. 13 Wall. i9o (187t), where it was held that
there had never been a contract between Jefferson College and the
holders of scholar-hips in that institution that instruction in the college
was to be forever given at Canonsburg; therefore a consolidation of
the college with Washington College and a removal of the consolidated
inAitutiuns to Washington did not impair any contract between Jefferson College and the holders of its scholarships.

So albo in Cunber-

land and Ohio R. R. Co. v. Barren County Court. io Bush. (Ky.) 604

(1874), in which the ch:rter of a railroad company gave it the right to
s',licit and receive imniediate .-ubscriptions to its stock from the counties

through which its road pas-sed. The voters in one of these counties
votcl.to subscribc to the company's stock, and the county court directed
the Judge thereof, upon certain conditions, to subscribe accordingly.
The legislature enacted a law prohibiting the subscription until a
certain amount of the work (if construction of the road had been comlleted within the county. This act was sustained by the court because
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changes in the contract wrought by the state's amendatory
act did not impair its obligation and were such changes as
would have been permissible even if no power had been
reserved by the state to alter or repeal the charter of the
corporation which had entered into the contract. 98
Although the trend of authority is thus, very properly,
against the allowance to the states of power to alter or
impair existing contracts of corporations with third persons
under the guise of an exercise of the power to amend the
no contract of subscription had yet been entered into between the
company and the qualified county authorities. In State of Maine v.
Bohentier, 96 Me. 257 (1902), the defendant had obtained from a medical society a license to practise medicine within the state, the society
having been empowered by the state (subject to the reserved power)
to grant such licenses. A later act of the legislature, under pain of
criminal penalty for disobedience, required all aersons to he registered
by the State Board of Registration of Medicine and Surgery. The act
was held valid, and the defendant, who had failed or refused to register,
was convicted under it. If there can be said to have been any contract
still existing between the defendant and the society, it did not provide,
as, indeed, it could not have provided, against the imposition by the
state of additional qualifications for the practice of medicine; it was
made subject by implication to the exercise of the police power of the
state, and was therefore not impaired by subsequent legislation of that
nature. Otherwise than as an exercise of the police power the legislation would, it is believed, have been invalid so far as it purported to be
applicable to previous licensees of the society.
Thus the legislation in the Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700
(x878), provided for the etablislnent by the railroad company of a
fund from which to meet its obligations as they matured; this might
be justified as merely strengthening and increasing the effectiveness
of the contractual obligation betweCLn the company and its creditors.
So al-o a creditor may be deprived of a particuk.r remedy for the
recovery of his claim, without impairing the obligation of the contract
Niitl his debtor, provided that other substantial remedies are left to
him. Accordingly the right of attachment as process for starting suit
may lawfully be abrogated by the legislature, even though it affect

contracts between a corporation and its creditors. Read v. Frankfort
Bank, 23 Me. 318 (1843) ; Bowker v. 11111, 6o Me. 172 (1812). These
two cases, however, are of doubtful authority in deciding that such
legislation would be valid as to e.risting attachment liens, which they
hold may be dissolved by act of the legislattre. This would seem to
be the deprivation of a vested property right. Another example of the
operation of this same principle is to be found in Robinson v. Gardner,
i8 Gratt. (Va.) 5o9 (I868), where an act of the legislature forbade
banks, in making assignments, to create priorities among their creditors.
The banks had formerly had that right; i'ut no particular creditor could
complain of its abolition bccaue he u\ould have no vested right to the
mere chance of obtaining a preference, even if the bank afterwards
signified a desire to prefer him; and hkicontract with the bank cannot
be said, therefore, to have been impairco by a law establishing a pro
rata distribution of as-ets among creditors.
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charters of such corporations, yet the one limitation upon
this general proposition must carefully be rememberednamely, that the state can make any alterations in the
charters of corporations which it could otherwise have made
under its reserved power, notwithstanding the fact that the
corporation may meanwhile have entered into contracts the
obligatioh of which indirectly will be impaired by such
amendatory act of the state. If the state has reserved the
right to revoke the franchises of the corporation, it may do
so, however dire may be the effect of such revocation upon
the existing liabilities of the corporation.99 If the state has
granted to the corporation an exemption from state taxation, and the charter of the corporation is subject to the
reserved power, the state may, in exercising that power,
recall such exemption or other special privileges granted,
and thus in various respects increase the burdens of the corporation, although the result of such action may be the
inability of the company to pay its outstanding indebtedness. 10 0 If the state has the reserved right to regulate the
tolls and charges of a railroad or other quasi-public corporation, it may employ such power ad libilum, so far as
the possibility of any effective objections on the part of
creditors is concerned.10 1 The corporation has an existence,
"When the charter of the corporation is repealed, its property becomes, and must be suffered by the legislature to become, a trust fund
for distribution among creditors and stockholders, according to the
rule established in Mumma v. Potomac Co., 8 Peters, 281 (1834), and
Bacon v.Robertson. IS 11ow. 48o (1855). Therefore there is no impairment of the obligation of contracts between the corporation and its
creditors caused by a dissolution of the corporation. Creditors must
foresee the possibility of such dissolution just as they must anticipate
the death of a natural person.
"°Storrie v. Hlouston City Street Railway Co., 9- Tex. i-9 (1898)-.
Louisville Water Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 1 (189i); Appeal Tax Court
of Baltimore City v. Baltimore Academy of the Visitation. 5o Md. 437
(1878); Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Mason City and Fort Dodge R. R.
Co.. 128 Fed. Rep. 230 (1904).
",Attorney-General v. Railroad Companies, 35 Wisc. 425 (1874);
Bondholders v. Railroad Commissioners. Case No. 1625, 3 Fed. Cas.

846 (1874). NWe are dealing here with the subject only of legislative
power; whether it would be politic for the state indirectly to impair
the security of the creditors of such corporations is a different question. " If it be admitted that the reserved power to alter all laws
creating corporation- authorizes the legi:lature to regulate the rates
of charge of a railroad company for the transportation of persons and
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rights, franchises, and privileges which are subject to revocation or change, and it cannot assure to one contracting
with it any greater permanency in these rights than it can
claim for itself as against the state. It occupies a position
analogous to that of a tenant at will, and just as such a
tenant cannot mortgage his estate for a greater interest than
he himself has therein, so a corporation cannot, by entering
into contracts with third persons, secure for itself any additional immunity from the exercise by the state of its reserved
power. A person dealing with a corporation knows, or
should know, of the precarious tenure of the existence and
privileges of the corporation with which he is contracting,
and therefore he enters into such contract with his eyes
open, and must abide by the consequences of any subsequent legislation of the state which is justified by the
reserved power.
"Persons making contracts with a private corporaticn
know that the legislature, even without the assent of the
corporation, may amend, alter, or modify their charters in
all cases where the power to do so is reserved in the charter
or in any general antecedent law in operation at the time
the charter was granted. . . . Such contracts made between
individuals and the corporation do not vary or in any manner change or modify the relation between the state and the
corporation in respect to the right of the state to alter,
modify', or amend such a charter, as the power to pass such
laws depends upon . . . some reservation made at the
time, as evidenced by sonic pre-existing general law or by
an express provision incorporated into the charter. . . . It
is a mistake to suppose that the existence of such a contract
between the corporation and an individual would inhibit the
legislature from altering, modifying, or amending the charter of the corporation by virtue of a right reserved to that
property. it should not, in common hone-ty, be so used as to destroy
or essentially impair the value of mortgages and other obligations
executed under express authority of the state. The reserved power
has not generally been supposed to authorize the legislature to revoke
the contracts of the corporation with third persons, or to impair any
vested rights acquired under them." Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice
Field in re Stoe v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. IS (876).
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effect . . . if, in view of all the circumstances, the legislature should see fit to exercise that power." 2

" It (the reserved power) becamne, by operation of law, a
part of every contract or mortgage made by the company.
. . . The share and bondholders took their stock or their
securities subject to this paramount condition, and of which
they, in law, had notice. If the corporation, by making a
contract or deed of trust on its property, could clothe its
creditors with an absolute, unchangeable right, it would
enable the corporation, by its own act, to abrogate one of
the provisions of the fundamental law of the state." 103
.Nor
is the right of the state so to amend or modify the
charter abridged or in any manner affected by executory
contracts entered into by the company with third persons
before the amending act was passed. The Macon Construction Company in dealing with the railroad company was
bound to take notice of the general law of the state, under
which the right and power were reserved which have been
exercised. .

. A corporation in the possession of fran-.

chises held at the will of the state cannot hinder the resumption or modification of those franchises by entering into
executory contracts with third persons. Nor can that effect
be wrought ky like contracts between the parties immediately contracting with the corporation and sub-contractors
under them. On no contract whatsoever does the amendmcnt now in question have any direct effect. Its only effect
upon contracts is incidental, and if they cannot be performed
consistently with the alteration in the charter made by the
amending statute, their performance, in so far as thus hindered or obstructed, will be excused, the rule of law being
that performance of contracts when rendered impossible by
act of law stands excused. .

.

. In so far as this or any

other executorv contract has been rendered less valuable or
profitable to the parties concerned by the legislation in question, that is a consequence which should have been foreseen
as possible and which must be accepted by the parties as an
incident of the exercise by the legislature of its rightful
" Pcnnsyl-.iiia College Case.. 13 Wall. I9o (1871).
" Pick v. C:icago and Norlhcastern Rail-way Co., 94 U. S. 164 (i89o).
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legislative power. Surely it cannot rationally be contended
that because the alteration of charters with respect to the
latitude of the franchises granted may or does operate unfavorably upon executory contracts made by or under the
corporations, the charters must remain unaltered in this
respect and the reserved power in the legislature be reduced
to a power in name only." 104
\Vhen it is said that persons dealing with a corporation
do so with actual or constructive knowledge of the reserved
power of the state over the charter of the corporation, it
must at the same time -be borne in mind that this means
nothing more than the knowledge of such power as properly
can be exercised by the state over the corporations which it
has created. The existence, franchises, exemptions, and
privileges of the corporation are held by it at the will of
the state, -and creditors must ar.icipate the possibility of
their revocation. But as the state cannot, under the reserved
power, declare a confiscation of the property of the corporation, it is not required of third persons contracting with the
corporation that they tAke the possibility of such future
action by the state into their consideration. The state
cannot, under the reserved power, limit or regulate the
power of the corporation to contract, to any greater extent
than such limitation or regulation would be justified as an
exercise of the police power in the case of natural persons;
therefore one dealing with the corporation need not consider
the likelihood of such legislation. For this reason it is
believed that the decision rendered by the Federal Supreme
Court in the case of the Unitcd Statcs v. Union Paciic
Rail-way, i6o U. S. I (1895), is open to criticism-at least
in the broad language in which the opinion is couched. The
facts of the case were that by two successive acts, each of
which was made subject to the reserved power, Congress
subsidized the Union Pacific Railroad Company, and required it and its allied companies to operate their railroads
and telegraph systems for all purposes of travel and cominunication as c,,itintious lines, without any discrimination
3lacon and Birininghan: R. R. Co. v. Gibson, 85 Ga. i(89o).
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against one another or against third persons. Subsequently
the Union Pacific. Company entered into an agreement -with
the Western Union Telegraph Company, whereby the latter
was given absolute control of all telegraphic business on
the route of the railroad company. Congress thereupon
passed an act requiring all railroad companies which had
been subsidized by the government, and required in their
acts of incorporation to construct and operate telegraph
lines, to operate such lines by their own agents; and the
act further directed the Attorney-General to institute proceedings to annul and vacate all ultra vircs contracts which
had been entered into by these railroad companies with other
persons or companies. The government accordingly attempted to annul the aforesaid contract between the Union
Pacific Company and the Western Union Telegraph Company, and the Supreme Court sustained the government's
contention and declared this contract null and void. The
court argued that the railroad company had never had the
right, under its original act of incorporation, to make such
a contract, and, if that be so, the decision reached is unobjectionable. But the court proceeds in its opinion to state
that even if the contract was valid when made, Congress
could, under its reserved power, require the railroad company itself to exercise its telegraphic franchises, and could
thus nullify its pre-existing contract with the Western Union
Company. " It is of no consequence that such legislation
may defeat the purpose contemplated by the parties, . . .
for they contracted, and could only have contracted, in view
of the possible exercise by Congress of the power expressly
reserved by it. .

.

. We have, therefore, considered the

question before us just as if a contract or arrangement between the railroad and a telegraph company for the construction by the latter of a telegraph line on the route of the
former expressly recited the provision of the Act of 1862,
by which Congress reserved the power, to be exerted at any
time. to add to. amend, or repeal the act which authorized
such contract or arrangement." Assuming, as the court did
assume, that 0ngress would not have been able to impair
the contract had there been in the act of incorporation no
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reservation of the power of amendment or repeal, the case
seems to err in its statement, not so much of the doctrines
governing the power of a state over contracts between corporations and third persons, as of the amount of control
which Congress could exercise over the corporation itself.
It is true that whatever power was possessed by the government to legislate with reference to the charter of the Union
Pacific Company could be exercised by it notwithstanding
the existence of contracts meanwhile entered into between
the company and other companies or persons. But the question is, what rights did Congress have over the railroad
company? It could repeal its franchises, and had it done
this the telegraph company could not have been heard to
complain that its contract with the Union Pacific Company
was thereby rendered valueless and void. But could the
government, as an exercise of the reserved power, compel
the railroad company to operate a telegraph system in conjunction with its railroad, and thus nullify any other
arrangements it might meanwhile have made with independent telegraph companies? It if submitted that the reserved
power clause in the charter of incorporation conferred no
such authority, even if it were true that " by its reservation
of authority to add to, alter, amend, or repeal the acts in
question, whenever it chose so to do, Congress, subject tothe limitation that rights actually vested or transactions fully
consummated could not be disturbed, intended to keep within
its control the entire subject of railroad and telegraphic
communication between the Missouri River and the Pacific
Ocean, through the agency of corporations created by it, or
that had accepted the bounty of the government." If Congress had no power to make the requirements of the railroad company which it sought to exact, it would follow that
the telegraph company could not be compelled by these
attempted amendments to relinquish its existing contract
with the Union Pacific Company, even had that company
desired and solicited the amendatory legislation which Congress had enacted.
There is an interesting problem which it is conceived
may arise in reference to the right of a state, under a re-
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served power, to affect contracts entered into between a
corporation and third prsons, but which, as far as known,
has not yet offered itself for adjudication. We have seen
that the limitation of the liability of stockholders to corporate creditors is a franchise or privilege granted by the
state, and may therefore be regulated by the state under
the reserved power, and cases have been cited in which the
states did exercise such power by creating or increasing the
personal liability of stockholders over and above the fully
paid-up value of their stock subscriptions. Suppose, however, that the state were to decrease the liability of stockholders-to say, for example, that their stock should be
liable only to the amount already paid in and that there
should be no further assessments collected thereon. Would
such legislation be valid as against the then existing creditors of the corporation?'5 Theoretically it would seem
that the creditors of the corporation knew, or should have
known, at the time they first contracted with the corporation
that the regulation and extent of the liability of the stockholders were within the uncontrolled discretion of the state,
and therefore that any subsequent diminution of such
liability was one of the risks assumed by them in dealing
with a corporation whose charter was subject to the reserved power. On the other hand it might well be contended
that legislation of this nature is for the evident benefit of
the corporation. not of the state, an( therefore does not
come properly within the historic purpose of the reserved
power clauses, which were intended to allow the state to
make changes in the corporate charter without the assent
and even in spite of the dissent of the corporation; it would
be in effect the allowance by the state to the corporation of
the right to repudiate its debts. It is belived that the courts
would not sustain such legislation. A close analogy to the
" In the absence of a reserved power there is no doubt that any act
decreasing the liability of stockholders, or repealing a statute imposing
additional and peroinal liability upon them, is unconstitutional as to
the then exi-ting creditors of tli- corporation. Hatzethorne v. Calef, 2
W
o0all.
(1864) : Conant v. V'an Schaick, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 87 (1857);
McDonnell v. AL71,ama Gold Lije Insurance Co., 85.Ala. 401 (I888)
l'ood-worlh v. Bowics, 61 Kans. 569 (i9oo).
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problem here suggested is to be found in those cases in
which it has been held that the legislature cannot so revoke
the charter of a municipality, or reduce its taxing power
to such an extent, as to impair its ability to pay its existing
indebtedness; 106 nor can it divide a municipality into two
distinct districts without providing for an assumption of
the indebtedness of the municipality by the districts thus
created. 10 7 The charter of a municipality is subject to the
legislation of the state, unchecked by the provision of the
Constitution forbidding the impairment of the obligation of
contracts, and accordingly is in a position somewhat similar
to that of a private corporation whose charter may, by
proper reservation of the power, he repealed or altered by
the legislature. Ordinarily the state may make changes in
the organization of a city government or in its charter privileges, just as it may in the case of a corporation subject to
the reserved power. 08 But the state, as has been pointed
out, cannot legislate in regard to the charter .or powers of
a municipality so as to lessen the security or means of payment of the claims of creditors.109 The same principle
would seem to be applicable to legislation lessening the
liability of the stockholders of a corporation to pay its indebtedness already contracted, and the courts would probably, should the occasion arise, refuse to sustain the validity
of an act which palpably would tend to render dealings with
corporations so unsafe as to be practically prohibited.
The question as to how far the state can exercise its
reserved power in limiting the power of a corporation to
contract with third persons has already been considered. It
was pointed out, in criticism of the opinion of the justices
".1iln.'r's Administrator v. City of Pensacola,

2

Woods (U. S.),

632 (1875); Von Iioffinan v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 (r866);
State v. City of ,\'eCOrleans. 37 La. Ann. 13 (1885); W1olff v. Neo
Orleans. 10i3 U. S. 358 (8,o).
"o.1lountPleasant v. Beekwith, ,zoo U. S. 514 (879) ; Prcwis v. City
of Dluth. 3 'McCrary (U. S.). 2i9 (M&qi) ; Mobile v. Vatson, 1I6 U.
S. 2S4)(85).

I'hiladelphia v. Fo.r. 64 Pa. St. i69 (1870).
Smith v. City of . IpPlhton. 19 N\°isc. 469 (1865) ; People v. Corn-

mon Council of the City of Buffalo, 140 N. Y. 300 (1893), and cases
supra.
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of the Supreme Court of Maine, 97 Me. 59o (i9o3), that
the state should have no greater rights in this respect over
corporations than over natural persons, because the power
of a corporation to contract is not a franchise or privilege
which properly can be said to have been granted to it. by
the state. In both cases the determining consideration
should be the extent of the police power of the state. There
are several decisions in the reports in which, under the
reserved power, the states have been allowed to enforce acts
forbidding certain kinds of contracts to be entered into by
corporations except with terms specifically required by
the acts-for example, acts providing that if the corporation
should discharge one of its employees with or without cause,
the latter's wages should become at once due and payable,
and if not forthwith paid should be held to continue at the
contract rate until payment was made; 110 or acts providing
that the corporation must pay its- employees weekly; 11a or
prohibiting contracts with employees for the payment of
their wages otherwise than in money.'1 2 These laws have
almost uniformly been sustained, the contention being that
although such restrictions on the power to contract may be
invalid in the case of natural persons, as being a deprivation
of their liberty and property not justified by the police
power of the state, yet the power to contract of corporations
which are subject to the reserved power of the state can be
limited at the will of the legislature. for corporations derive
their right to contract as a privilege from the state, which
therefore may either wholly recall the right, or suffer it to
remain tinder such limitations and restrictions as the state
may see fit to impose. This argument is manifestly fallacious. We have seen that it is only the exemptions and
franchises of a corporation which can be recalled or limited
wbthe state. and that the right to enter into contracts does
not constitute a franchise of the corporation. If the police
11Leep v. R,:il,'ay Co., ;8 Ark. 407 (1894) ; St. Louis, Iron Mountain and St. t',:ul Railwav v. Faul. 173 U. S. 404 (1,%8).
tfanufarturing Co.. i8 R. I. 16 (1892)
" State v. rt,.,n & Slarpe .
contra. Brae,'vill. Coal Co. v. The Pople, I47 111. 66 (1893).
"'Shaffer & -Ifunn v. Union Mining Co., 55

Md.

74 (188o).
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power is sufficient to enable the state to limit the right of a
natural person to make ,contracts of the kind above outlined,-as to which the decisions in the various jurisdictions
are not in harmonv.-it will allow such legislation similarly
in the case of corporations. whether there be a reserved
power of amendment or not. If, on the other hand, the
limitation be held invalid in the case of :natural persons, it
is likewise invalid in the case of corporations. The reserved
power does trot enter into the question, for it does not extend
to control of the right of corporations to make contracts
with other corporations or persons. When it is attempted
to make acts of this kind applicable to contracts previously
entered into between corporations and their employees, the
legislation is doubly objectionable: it is an interference with
the right of the corporation to contract, which is an undoubted property right, and it also involves the impairment
of the obligation of all such pre-existing contracts.
This completes our survey of the -extent of the power of
states over cororations whose charters are -granted under
a reserved power of revocation or amendment. Whether
these reservation clauses-would have come into existence had
the doctrine of the police powver and the other limitations
upon the Dartmouth College decision originated earlier in
our constitutional history cannot, of course, be predicated.
That. properly construed. they forn a helpful part of our
constitutional and statute laws, by rendering corporations
subject to state and therefore to popular control, is undoubted. But it is just as clear that, improperly extended in
their scope, they have been construed to give to the ,legislatures of the states in many cases an amount of power over
corporations which 'is dangerously inconsistent with American theories of the sanctity of property and of contract
rights-a power which renders investments in the stock of
corporations unsafe because subject-to legislative whims and
tyranny, and calling, therefore, it is submitted, for a careful
revision of prevailing judicial tendencies in this important
subject of state and federa'l juri-prudence.
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APPENDIX.
RESERVED POWER

C .AUSES

IN

THE LATEST

CONSTITUTIONS,

CODES, AND STATUTES OF THE STATES.

ALABAMA.
Constitution of x9oz, Art. XII, § 229: "The legislature shall pass ...
general laws under which corporations may be organized and corporate
powers obtained, subject, nevertheless, to repeal at the will of the legislature; and shall pass general laws under which charters may be altered
or amended ....
The charter of any corporation shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal under general laws."
Idem, § 238: "The legislature shall have the power to alter, amend or

revoke any charter of any corporation now existing, and revocable at
the ratification of this Constitution, or any that may be hereafter
created, whenever, in its opinion, such charter may be injurious to the
citizens of this State; in such manner, however, that no injustice shall
be done to the stockholders."
ARKANSAS.
Constitution of 1874, Art. XII, § 6: "Corporations may be formed
under general laws, which laws may, from time to time, be altered or
repealed. The General Assembly shall have the power to alter, revoke
or annul any charter of any corporation now existing, and revocable
at the adoption of this Constitution, or any that may be hereafter
created, whenever, in its opinion, such charter may be injurious to the
citizens of this State; in such manner, however, that no injustice
shall be done to the corporators."
Statutes of 1894, Ch. XLVII, Art. II, § 5358: "The General Assembly
may at any time, for just cause, rescind the powers of any joint-stock
corporation created pursuant to the provisions of this act, and prescribe such mode as may be necessary or expedient for the settlement
of its affairs."
CALIFORNIA.
Constitution of 1879, Art. XII, § I: "Corporations may be formed
under general laws, but shall not be created by special act. All laws
now in force in this State concerning corporations, and all laws that
may be hereafter passed pursuant to this section, may be altered from
time to time or repealed."
Codcs and Statutes of r886; Civil Code, Diz. I, Part IV, Title I, Ch. III,
Art. III, § 384:" The legislature may at any time amend or repeal this
part, or any title, chapter, article, or section thereof, and dissolve all
corporations created thereunder; but such amendment or repeal does
not nor does the dissolution of any such corporation take away or
impair any remedy given against any such corporation, its stockholders
or officers, for any liability which has been previously incurred."

LIMITATIONS OF THE POWER OF A STATE.

COLORADO.
Constitution of z876, Art. XV, § 3: "The General Assembly shall have
the power to alter, revoke or annul any charter of any corporation now
existing, and revocable at the adoption of this Constitution, or any that
may be hereafter created, whenever, in its opinion, such charter may be
injurious to the citizens of the State; in such manner, however, that
no injustice shall be done to the corporators."
Statutes of 1891, Cis. XXX, Di,. I, § 634: "The General Assembly may,
at any time, alter, amend or repeal this act, and shall at all times have
power to prescribe such regulations and provisions as it may deem
advisable, which regulations and provisions shall be binding on any
and all corporations formed under the provisions of this act." -

CONNECTICUT.
Act of June 22, 7903, § 43: "All acts creating or authorizing the organization of corporations, or altering the charters of corporations
previously existing, which have been or shall be passed by the General
Assembly, and the charters of all corporations heretofore granted, and.
under which no corporations have been organized, shall be subject to
alteration, amendment, and repeal at the pleasure of the General Assembly, unless otherwise expressly provided in such acts; but no such
amendment or repeal shall impair any remedy against an. such corporation, or against its officers, directors, or stockholders, for any
liability which. shall have been previously incurred."
DELAWARE.
Act of March 17, i9o3, § 14o: "This act may be amended or repealed
at the pleasure of the legislature, but such amendment or repeal shall
not take away or impair any remedy against any corporation under this
act, or its officers, for any liability which shall have been previously
incurred. This act, and all amendments thereof, shall be a part of the
charter of every such corporation, except so far as the same are napplicable and inappropriate to the objects of such corporation."
Note: The Constitution of 1831 contained a clause reserving to the

legislature power to alter and repeal charters, but there is no such
provision in the Constitution of x897.
FLORIDA.
Note: There does not seem to be any reservation of power in the
legislature to alter or revoke charters, either in the Constitution or
general statutes of the state.
GEORGIA.
Chil Code of r895, Title I, § 188o: "In all cases of private charters
hereafter granted the State reserves the right to withdraw the franchise, unless such right is expressly negatived in the charter."

162

LIMITATIONS OF THE POWER OF A STATE.

IDAHO.

Constitution of z889, Art. XI, §z: "Any such general law [for the
organization of corporations] shall be subject to future repeal or alteration by the legislature."
Idem., § 3: "The legislature may provide by law for altering, revoking,
or annulling any charter of incorporation existing and revocable at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution, in such manner, however,
that no injustice shall be done to the corporators."
Re-v. Statutes of rS87, Part II, Title 11', Ch. I, § 264r: "The legislature may at any time amend or repeal this title or any chapter, articles,
or section thereof, and dissolve all corporations created thereunder;
but such amendment or repeal does not, nor does the dissolution of
any such corporation, take away or impair any remedy given against
any such corporation, its stockholders or officers, for any liability which
has been previously incurred."

ILLINOIS.
Act of April 18, z872, § 9: "The General Assembly shall, at all times,
have power to prescribe such regulations and provisions as it may deem
advisable, which regulations and provisions shall be binding on any
and all corporations formed under the provisions of this act."

INDIANA.
Act of March 9, rgoz: "This act [for the organization of corporations]
may be repealed or amended at the discretion of the legislature."

IOWA.
Constitution of r857, Art. VIII, § z2: " Subject to the provisions of
this article, the General Assembly shall have power to amend or repeal
all laws for the organization or creation of corporations ... by a vote
of two-thirds of each branch of the General Assembly."
Code of 1897, Part I, Title IX, Ch. I, § 1619: " The articles of incorporation, by-laws, rules, and regulations of corporations hereafter organized under the provisions of this title, or whose organization may
be adopted or amended hereunder, shall, at all times, be subject to
legislative control, and may be, at any time, altered, abridged, or set
aside by law, and every franchise obtained, used, or employed by such
corporation may be regulated, withheld, or be subject to conditions
imposed upon the enjoyment thereof, whenever the General Assembly
shall deem necessary for the public good."

KANSAS.
Constitution of i859, .irt. XII, § z: " Corporations may be created
under general laws, but all such laws may be amended or repealed."
KENTUCKY.

Constitution of 1891, Bill of Rights, §3: "Every grant of a franchise,
privilege or excmotion shall remain subject to revocation, alteration or
anendment."
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Statutes of Z8o4. Ch. LIX. § 1987: "All charters and grants of or to
corporations, or amendments thereof, enacted or granted since the fourteenth of February. i856, . . shall be subject to repeal at the will
of the General As-embly, unless a contrary intent be therein plainly
expressed; provided, that whilst privileges and franchises so granted
may be repealed, no repeal shall impair -other rights previously vested."
LOUISIANA.
Civil Code of 1$7o, § 447: "A corporation legally established may be
dissolved by an act of the legislature, if they deem it necessary or convenient to the public interest; provided, that when the act of incorporation imports a contract on the faith of which individuals have
advanced money or engaged their property, it cannot be repealed without providing for the reimbursement of the advances made, or making
full indemnity 'to such individuals."
Note: For a construction of this proviso, see Asylum v. New Orleans,
io5 L. S. 362 (1881).
MAINE.
Constitution of zSzo, Art. I1, § 14: "However formed, they [i.e., corporations] shall forever be subject to the general laws of the state."
Revised Statutes of z9o3, Title IV. Ch. XLVII, § : "Acts of incorporation passed since 'March 17, 1831, may be amended, altered or repealed by the legislature, as if express provision therefor were made in
them, unless they contain an express limitation."
MARYLAND.
Constitution of 5$67,. Art. I1. § 48,- tar. ?: "All charters granted, or
adopted in pursuance of this section, and all charters heretofore granted
and created, subject to repeal and modification, may be altered, from
time to time. or be repealed: provided, nothing herein contained shall
lie construed to extend to banks, or the incorporation thereof."
Public General Law.'s of iSSS, .Art. XXII. § 85: " Every corporation
formed under the provisions of this article, -hall be subject to any and
all provisions and regulations which may hereafter, by any change in
or amendments of the laws of this State, be made applicable to such
corporation."
MASSACHUSETTS.
Revised L.'.aws
of zg9o.?, Title XV, Ch. CIX, § 3: "Every act of incorporation passed after the eleventh day of .March in the year 1831 shall
be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the General Court.
All corporations which are organired under general laws shall be subject to such laws as may le hereafter paz-ed affecting or altering their
corporate rights or duties or (solving them .... Such laws of anendment. alteration or rt-peal, or such dissolution shall not take away or
impair any remedy which may exizt by law .. . against tLe corporation. its members or c.ficer.-, for a liability previously incurred?'
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MICHIGAN.
Constitution of i85o, Art. XV, § 1: " All laws passed pursuant to this
section [referring to tie incorporation of companies] may be amended,
altered or repealed."
Idem, § 8: "The legislature shall pass no law altering or amending
any act of incorporation heretofore granted, without the assent of twothirds of the members elected to each house, nor shall any such act be
renewed or extended. This restriction shall not apply to municipal
corporations."
Compiled Laws of z897, Title IX, Part XXVII, Ch. CCXXX, § 2o:
" Every act of incorporation passed since the twentieth day of April in
the year 1839, or which shall be hereafter passed, shall, at any time, be
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal at the pleasure of the legislature: provided, that no act of incorporation shall be repealed, unless
for some violation of its charter or other default, when such charter
shall contain an express provision limiting the duration of the same."
MINNESOTA.
General Statutes of 1894, Ch. XXXIV, Title II, § 2837: "This act [relating to corporations not having the right of eminent domain] may be
altered or amended at the pleasure of the legislature, but not so as to
divest or impair any right of property acquired under the same."
MISSISSIPPI.
Constitution of 189o, Art. IV, § 88: "The legislature shall pass general
laws . . . under which corporations may be created, organized, and
their acts of incorporation altered, and all such laws shall be subject to
repeal or amendment"
Iden, Art. VII, § 178: "The legislature shall have power to alter,
amend or repeal any charter of incorporation now existing and revotable. and any that may hereafter he created, whenever, in its opinion,
it may be for the public interest to do so; provided, however, that no
injustice shall be done to the stockholders."
MISSOURI.
Note: In the revised statutes of 1845 and 1855 (Art. Ii Ch. XXXIV,
§ 7) there was a provision that " the charter of every corporation that
shall hereafter be granted by the legislature shall be subject to alteration. suspension and repeal in the discretion of the legislature," but no
such provision exi-ts in the latest revision, that of 1889.
MONTANA.
Constitution of 1889, Art. XV, §3: "The legislative assembly shall
have the power to alter, revoke or annul any charter of incorporation
existing at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, or which may
be hereafter incorporated, whenever in its opinion it may be injurious
to the citizens of the-state."
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Civil Code, Dh. I, PartIV, Title I, Ci. I, Art. I, §394: " Every grant
of corporate power is subject to alteration, suspension or repeal, in the
discretion of the legislative assembly."

NEBRASKA.
Constitution of 1875, Art. XIII, § .r: "All general laws passed pursuant to this section [relating to incorporation of companies] may be
altered from time to time, or repealed."
NEVADA.
Constitution of z864, Art. VIII, § .: "Corporations may be formed
under general laws, and all such laws may, froin time to time, be altered
or repealed."
Act of March z6, 19o3, § i13: "This act may be amended or repealed
at the pleasure of the legislature, but such amendment or repeal shall
not take away or impair any remedy against any corporation under this
act, or its officers, for any liability which shall have been previously
incurred; this act and all amendments thereof shall be a part of the
charter of every such corporation except so far as the same are inapplicable and inappropriate to the objects of such corporation."
NEW HAMPSHIRE.
Public Statutes of 1891, Title XX, Cit. CXLVIII, § xg: "The legislature may at any time alter, amend or repeal the charter of any corporation or the laws under which it was established, or may modify or
annul any of its franchises, duties and liabilities; but the remedy
against the corporation, its members or officers, for any liability previously incurred, shall not be impaired thereby."
NEW JERSEY.
Constitution of 1844, Art. It", § 7, par. ri: "The legislature . . . shall
pass general laws under which corporations may be organized and corporate powers of every nature obtained, subject, ne-ertheless, to repeal
or alteration at the will of the legislature."
Act of April 21, 1896, § 4: "The charter of every corporation or -any
supplement thereto or amendment thereof shall be subject to alteration,
suspension, and repeal, in the discretion of the legislature, and the
legislature may at pleasure dissolve any corporation."
Iden, § 5: "This act may be amended or repealed at the pleasure of
the legislature, and every corporation created under this act shall be
bound by such amendment; but such amendment or repeal shall not
take away or impair any remedy against any such corporation or its
officers for any liability which !.hall have been previously incurred; this
act and all amendments thereof shall be a part of the charter of every
corporation heretofore or hereafter formed hereunder, except so far as
the same are inapplicable and inappropriate to the objects of such
corporation."
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NEW YORK.
Constitution of 1894, Art. I"VII, § r: "All general laws and special
acts passed pursuant to this section [relating to the incorporation of
companies] may be altered from time to time or repealed."
Act of 1895, Ch. 672: "The charter of every corporation shall bi subject to alteration, suspension and repeal, in the discretion of the legislature-"
NORTH CAROLINA.
Constitution of z868, Art. VIII,§ i: "All general laws and special acts
passed pursuant to this section [relating to the incorporation of companies] may be altered from time to time or repealed."
Act of March II, 19o, § 6: "The charter of every corporation, or any
supplement thereto or amendment thereof, shall be subject to alteration,
modification, amendment or repeal, in the discretion of the legislature,
-and the legislature may at pleasure dissolve any corporation."
Idem, § 7: "This act may be amended or repealed at the pleasure of
the legislature, and every corporation shall be bound by such amendment; but such amendment or repeal shall not take away or impair
any remedy against any such corporation, or its officers.- for any liability which shall have been previously incurred; this act and all
amendments thereof shall be a part of the charter of every corporation
heretofore formed, or hereafter formed hereunder, except so far as the
same are inapplicable and inappropriate to the objects of such corporation."
NORTH DAKOTA.
Constitution of zSo, Art. VII, § 13r: "The legislative assembly shall
provide by general laws for the organization of all corporations hereafter to be created, and any such law, so passed, shall be subject to
future repeal or alteration.
Revised Code of z895, Ch. X1, Art. I, § 2851 : "Every grant of corporate power is subject to alteration, suspension, or repeal in the discretion of the legislative assembly."
OHIO.
Constitution of 1851, Art. XIII, § 2: "Corporations may be formed
under general laws, but all such laws may, from time to time, be altered
or repealed."
OREGON.
Costitution of 1857. Art. XI, § 2: "All laws pa-ed pursuant to this
secti'n Irelating to the incorporation of companies] may be altered,
aniended, or repealed, but not so as to impair or destroy any vested
corporate rights."
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PENNSYLVANIA.
"The General Assembly shall
Constitution of Z874, Att. Xl'7, § i:
have the power to alter, revoke or annul any charter of incorporation
now existing and revocable at the adoption of this Constitution, or that
may hereafter be created, whenever in their opinion it may be injurious
to the citizen, of the Commonwealth, in such manner, however, that
no injustice shall be done to the corporators."
Act of April 29, 1874, § 4: "The General Assembly reserves, the power
to revoke or annul any charter of incorporation granted or accepted
under the provisions of this act, whenever in the opinion of the said
Assembly it may be injurious to the citizens of this Commonwealth, in
such manner, however, that no injustice shall be done to the corporators or their successors."
RHODE ISLAND.
General Laus, 1896, Title XIX, Ch. CLXXVII, § zz: "Every corporation hereafter created shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter,
and its charter or articles of association may be amended or repealed
at the will of the General Assembly."
SOUTH CAROLINA.
Constitution of r895, Art. IX, § 2: " The General Assembiy shall provide by general laws ...for the organization of all corporations" hereafter to be created, and any such law so passed, as well as all charters
now existing, or hereafter created, shall be subject to future repeal or
alteration."
Code of 19o2, Part I, Cit. XLVII, § z842: " It shall be deemed a part
of the charter of every corporation created under the provisions of
any general law, and of every charter granted, renewed or amended by
act or joint resolution of the General Assembly (unless such act or
joint resolution shall, in express terms, declare the contrary), that such
charter, and every amendment and renewal thereof, shall always remain
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the General Assembly.".
SOUTH DAKOTA.
Constitution of 189o, Art. XVII, § 9: "The legislature shall have the
power to alter, revise or annul any charter of any corporation now
existing and revocable at the taking effect of this Constitution, or any
that may be created, whenever in their opinion it may be injurious to
the citizens of this State, in such a manner, however, that no injustice
shall be done to the corporators."
Revised Code of 19o3, Civil Code, Div. 11, Part III, Title II, Ch. III,
.Art 1,§ 398: " Every grant of corporate power is subject to alteration,
suspension, or repeal in the discretion of the legislature."
TENNESSEE.
Costitution of 187o, Art. XI, § 8: " The General Assembly shall provide by general laws for the organization of all corporations hereafter
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created, which laws may, at any time, be altered or repealed; and no
such alteration or repeal :-hall interfere with, or divest, rights which
have become vested."
Code of 1884, Part 1, Title IX, Ch. III, Art. I, § z699: "The powers
conferred on any company incorporated hereunder shall be subject to
repeal or amendment at the will of the legislature."
TEXAS.
Constitution of z876, Art. I, § 17: "All privileges and franchises
granted by the legislature or created under its authority, shall be subject to the control thereof."
Revised Statutes of 1895, Title XXI, Ci. II, Art. DCL: "All charters,
or amendments to charters, under the provisions of this chapter, shall
be subject to the power of the legislature to alter, reform or amend
the same."
UTAH.
Constitution of 1895, Art. XII: "All laws relating to corporations may
be altered, amended or repealed by the legislature."
VERMONT.
Statutes of 1894, Title XXI', Ch. CLXIV, § 3686: "Acts creating, continuing, altering or renewing a corporation or body politic, hereaftek
passed by the General Assembly, may be altered, amended or repealed
as public good requires."
VIRGINIA.
Constitution of 9o2. Art. XII, § 154: ". • •Such general laws may be
amended or repealed by the General Assembly; and all charters and
amendments of charters now existing and revocable, or hereafter
granted or extended, may be repealed at any time by special act."
Act of May 2r, 19o3. Ch. 1, § 6r: "This act or any part thereof may
be amended or repealed at the pleasure of the General Assembly, and
every corporation created under this act shall be bound by such amendment; but such amendment or repeal shall not take away or impair
any remedy against any such corporation or its officers for any liability which shall have been previously incurred; this act and all
amendments thereof shall be a part of the charter of every -corporation
formed hereunder, except so far as the same are inapplicable and inappropriate to the objects of such corporation."
WASHINGTON.
Constitution of iY89, Art. XII, § Z: "All laws relating to corporations
may be altered, amended, or repealed by the legislature at any time."
WEST VIRGINIA.
Code of 189r, Ch. LIII, § 8: "The right is hereby reserved to the legislature to alter any charter or certificate of incorporation hereafter

LIMITATIONS OF TIE POWER OF A STATE.

granted to a joint-stock company, and to alter or repeal any law applicable to such company. But in no case shall such alteration or
repeal affect the right of the creditors of the company to have its assets
applied to the discharge of its liabilities, or of its stockholders to have
the surplus, if any, which may remain after discharging its liabilities
and the expenses of winding up its affairs, distributed among themselves in proportion to their respective interests."

WISCONSIN.
Constitution of 1848, Art. XI, § r: " All general laws or special acts
enacted under the provisions of this section [relating to the organization of corporations] may be altered and repealed by the legislature at
any time after their passage.
Revised Statutes, 1898, Part I, Title XIX, Clh. LXXXV, § z768: "The
legislature may at any time limit or restrict the powers of any corporation organized under any law, and for just cause annul the same, and
prescribe such mode as may be necessary for the settlement of its
affair&"
WYOMING.
Constitution of z889, Art. X, § .: "All laws relating to corporations
may be altered, amended or repealed by the legislature at any time
when necessary for the public good and general welfare." .
Revised Statutes, ;899, Dim' 11, Title IV, Ch. I, § 3o5: "The legislature may, at any time, alter, amend or repeal this title, but such amendment or repeal shall not take away or impair any remedy given against.
or in favor of, any such corporation, its stockholders or officers, for any
liability which shall have been previously incurred."

Horace Stern.

